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The Changing Landscape of Trademark Law in Tinseltown: 
From Debbie Does Dallas to The Hangover  
 
 
Mark Bartholomew and John Tehranian 
 
 
Hollywood both creates and borrows.  This duality simultaneously implicates intellectual 
property law and the First Amendment.  While movies, television shows, sound recordings, and 
video games constitute valuable pieces of intellectual property in and of themselves, they 
frequently make use of the intellectual property of others, often without authorization or 
payment.  Trademarks—legally-protectable symbols used to indicate the source of goods and 
distinguish those goods from those sold or made by others—constitute one such of type of 
intellectual property.  Filmmakers often employ trademarks for expressive purposes to 
contextualise their work in the cultural and commercial milieu in which we live.  But in the 
process of exercising creative judgment by employing the use of trademarks in their works, they 
may find themselves subject to legal liability for infringement.  
Brand owners have grown increasingly sensitive to the (mis)use of their trademarks in 
entertainment content.  In 2012, the venerable Hollywood Reporter went so far as to muse about 
whether all the Mayan talk of the coming Armageddon was actually referring to (what it billed 
as) a Hollywood ‘trademarklawpocalypse.’1  In the span of a few weeks, a series of significant 
trademark disputes erupted, putting the entire industry on notice.  On the eve of the release of 
The Hobbit: An Unexpected Journey (2012), Warner Bros., New Line Cinema, and MGM 
successfully enjoined the distributor Global Asylum from releasing its own new film about 
hobbits under the name Age of the Hobbits (the film was later released as Clash of the Empires 
(2013)).  Anheuser-Busch took umbrage at the fact that Denzel’s Washington’s alcoholic pilot in 
Flight (2012) used Budweiser as his choice inebriant while drinking and driving.  Rizzoli 
Publications objected to NBC’s use of ‘Rizzoli’ as the name of comedian Ray Romano’s 
character on the series Parenthood (2010- ).  And when one of the characters in Woody Allen’s 
Midnight in Paris (2011) (mis)quoted author William Faulkner, the Faulkner Estate sued the 
film’s distributor Sony Classic Pictures for improperly associating the author with the movie.2 
Feuds between trademark holders and filmmakers are nothing new.  For example, in 
1979, the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders sued a New York cinema for showing the pornographic 
film Debbie Does Dallas (1978).  They alleged that the film was confusing to moviegoers 
because it contained a scene where a character wore a cheerleading uniform strikingly similar to 
the blue and white boots, blouses, and vests adorning the sideline representatives of ‘America’s 
Team.’3  The court hearing the case held in favour of the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, rejecting 
the cinema’s First Amendment defence on the ground that there were other ways to discuss 
sexuality and athletics without appropriating the Cheerleaders’ famous trade dress.4   
                                                 
1 In an emblematic sign of the times, intellectual property attorney Charles Colman has actually sought trademark 
protection for the term ‘trademarklawpocalypse.’ See TRADEMARKLAWPOCALPYSE Application, United States 
Patent and Trademark Office, Serial No. 85765482, filed 28 October 2012 (pending intent-to-use trademark 
application). 
2 See Faulkner Literary Rights, LLC v. Sony Classic Pictures, Inc., 12CV100-M-A (N.D. Miss., filed 25 October 
2012). The suit also included claims for copyright infringement. 
3 Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 203 (2d Cir.1979). 
4 Id. at 206. 
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Just a decade later, a decision by the same court regarding the balance between trademark 
rights and free speech produced a strikingly different result.  When famed Italian director 
Federico Fellini produced a movie about two fictional Italian cabaret performers who imitated 
Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire, he titled his movie Ginger and Fred (1986).  Screen legend 
Ginger Rogers sued for trademark infringement.  Just as the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders 
alleged unlawful use of their trademarked uniforms, Rogers contended that Fellini had 
improperly used her name without permission, thereby creating consumer confusion over her 
endorsement of the film.5  Yet in sharp contrast to the Cheerleaders’ case, the court rejected 
Rogers’ arguments, instead vindicating the filmmaker’s right to free expression in a crucial, 
precedent-setting victory.6  The court announced a new free speech safeguard (subsequently 
styled by other courts as ‘the Rogers defence’) for those using trademarks in an artistic fashion.7 
Fellini’s fortune forever changed the way courts have approached the balancing of 
trademark and free speech rights.  In the past two decades, courts have used the Rogers defence 
to protect numerous content creators and distributors from liability for unauthorised use of 
trademarks in artistic works.  In a recent suit, for example, a federal court drew on the Rogers 
defence to quickly dismiss claims of trademark infringement and unfair competition brought by 
Louis Vuitton against the makers of the blockbuster The Hangover II (2011) for a misleading 
reference to its name and famous Toile Monogram in a scene in the film.8 
This chapter explores how courts have sought to balance the competing interests at stake 
when filmmakers employ brand names and images in their work and brand owners threaten 
liability for trademark infringement.  Specifically, we use Rogers v. Grimaldi9 as a primary pivot 
point to trace the remarkable change in approaches that courts have taken to First Amendment 
defences in trademark cases over the past few decades.  To this end, we conduct case studies of 
two opinions—Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.10 (decided a decade 
before Rogers) and Louis Vuitton v. Warner Bros11 (decided two decades after Rogers)—to 
illustrate the increasing recognition of free speech defences to trademark infringement claims 
against filmmakers.  We also examine what may have precipitated this change and its potential 
impact on Hollywood’s future.  As we shall also see, the growing First Amendment defences to 
trademark liability are not without limits and the case law has not always favoured the First 
Amendment rights of content creators over the intellectual property rights of trademark holders.  
Even as courts have come to recognise greater protections for creators over the years, the 
increased presence of brands in everyday life means that Hollywood’s attempts at verisimilitude 
will continue to cause conflicts with the claims of brand owners. 
 
The Legal Landscape Before Rogers 
 
In the United States, trademark law is primarily the preserve of federal law, not the law of 
the individual states.  In the main, one federal statute—the Lanham Act of 1946—governs the 
use of trademarks.  Aggrieved trademark holders turn to the statute to seek legal recourse.  Over 
time, trademark law has expanded well beyond just the protection of words; images, colours, 
                                                 
5 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 997 (2d Cir. 1989).  
6 Id. at 1005. 
7 Id. at 1000.  
8 Louis Vuitton Mallatier S.A. v. Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 172 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
9 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). 
10 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979). 
11 Louis Vuitton, 868 F. Supp. 2d at 172. 
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sounds, and even distinctive packaging or the design of the product itself (known by the legal 
term of art “trade dress”) can enjoy protection.   
When the owner of one of these protectable symbols objects to another’s use of it, the 
Lanham Act provides one central ground for legal suit: likelihood of consumer confusion.  
Initially, actionable consumer confusion referred to situations where a defendant successfully 
passed off its goods as the goods of the mark holder.  Over time, however, courts have grown 
increasingly generous in recognising confusion, even countenancing scenarios where consumers 
only think that the authorised mark holder has somehow sponsored the defendant’s activities or 
where any initial consumer confusion is dispelled prior to purchase.  Once the mark holder 
demonstrates a likelihood of consumer confusion, a court will often issue a legal order halting 
the objectionable use.  One key exception comes when the defendant invokes a recognised 
defence to a claim of trademark infringement.  This is where the First Amendment can 
sometimes find a starring role within the world of trademark law.  There are times when, despite 
a likelihood of consumer confusion, the free-speech interests of an unauthorised mark user can 
trump the intellectual property rights of the mark holder.  
In the decades prior to the Second Circuit’s influential 1989 decision in Rogers v. 
Grimaldi, the way in which courts evaluated the trade-off between trademark rights and free 
expression in film was inconsistent.  Perhaps most prevalent was a legal test that asked whether 
‘alternative avenues’ existed for a filmmaker making unauthorised use of someone else’s brand.  
Under the test, if no alternative avenues to the mark’s use exist, then the use must be permitted 
under the First Amendment.  On the other hand, if the filmmaker can make her expressive point 
without using the plaintiff’s trademark, then the filmmaker has no free speech defence and can 
be held liable for trademark infringement.  The test is based on Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,12 a United 
States Supreme Court decision outside of trademark law upholding a shopping mall owner’s 
decision to prohibit the distribution of handbills opposing the Vietnam War.13  The prohibition 
did not violate the First Amendment, the Court reasoned, because the protestors had other 
avenues for making their views heard, including distribution of their handbills on the public 
streets and sidewalks surrounding the shopping centre.14   
Lower courts evaluating free speech defences in trademark infringement cases ran with 
the unrelated Tanner decision, declaring that the First Amendment only safeguards the 
unauthorised use of trademarks in movies (and other creative endeavours) when the use is so 
closely connected to the subject matter of an artistic work that the author has no alternative way 
of expressing what the work is about.15  In other words, if the filmmaker has another viable way 
to communicate her message, then she must forgo use of the complaining party’s trademark. 
 
Case Study: Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema 
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema represents the most significant example of a 
court applying this ‘alternative avenues’ test.  As its heading implies, the suit involved a 
combustible combination of two mainstays of modern American popular culture—pornography 
and professional athletics.  By the late 1970s, the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders were a 
nationally known brand.  They sold over three quarters of a million posters through 1977-78 and 
                                                 
12 407 U.S. 551 (1972). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 566-67. 
15 Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 398 (8th Cir. 1987); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. 
Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979). 
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seventy million viewers watched them perform at the 1978 Super Bowl.16  The Cheerleaders 
vigorously policed unauthorised uses of their brand, particularly when the use came in the 
context of adult entertainment.  When a group of former cheerleaders appeared in Playboy 
magazine in a faux Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders ensemble, and then attempted to resell a photo 
from the Playboy shoot as a commercial poster, the Cheerleaders successfully sued for trademark 
infringement.17  As Suzanne Mitchell, coordinator for the Cowboys Cheerleaders stated, ‘They 
can walk down Main Street, just don’t do it in our uniform.’18 
The Cheerleaders’ legal strategy also targeted the pornographic film industry.  In 1978, 
adult cinemas began to screen the popular pornographic film, Debbie Does Dallas.19  The plot of 
the film, which the court in review described as ‘a gross and revolting sex film,’ features a group 
of high school cheerleaders trying to travel to Texas for tryouts for the fictional ‘Texas Cowgirls’ 
cheerleading squad.  To raise the necessary travel funds, the cheerleaders turn to prostitution. In 
the film’s final scene, the movie’s eponymous star engages in a variety of sexual acts with the 
owner of a sporting goods store.  She performs these acts in various states of dress (and undress) 
while wearing her ‘Texas Cowgirls’ uniform.  Debbie’s uniform, with its particular striping, 
studding, buckle and colour schemes, bears a striking resemblance to the regalia of the Dallas 
Cowboys Cheerleaders. 
Objecting to the use of their uniform in this undignified manner, the Dallas Cowboys 
Cheerleaders sued several entities associated with Debbie Does Dallas for trademark 
infringement, contending the film-going public would find such use ‘confusing.’  They sought 
injunctions to prevent distribution or exhibition of the film.  One of the targets of the 
Cheerleaders’ litigation was the Pussycat Cinema, an adult theatre located just off Times Square 
in New York City.  The Pussycat Cinema operated at a time when adult theatres flourished in 
New York.  42nd Street, dubbed by Rolling Stone ‘the sleaziest block in America,’ housed 121 
adult establishments at the time of the lawsuit.20  In the past, New York theatres like the Pussycat 
Cinema had welcomed lawsuits as the increased publicity only served to fuel, rather than 
depress, ticket sales.21  But by the late 1970s, politicians were beginning to crack down on Times 
Square’s adult establishments.  In response to petitions from Times Square businesses, New 
York Mayor Abraham Beame created the Midtown Enforcement Project, which began targeting 
the theatres, and others trading in adult-themed merchandise, for city inspections and possible 
legal action.22  In 1978, when Debbie Does Dallas was released, Mayor Ed Koch continued this 
process, pushing existing adult theatres to close their doors or switch over to more ‘legitimate’ 
fare.23  In addition to initiating legal proceedings, Koch mobilised New York’s elite arts 
community, including performing arts and architectural preservation groups, to pressure the 
                                                 
16 Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1186 (5th Cir. 1979); Bill Curry, 
‘Something Else to Cheer About in Dallas: The Big Business of Being a Sidelines Star,’ The Washington Post, 17 
January 1979, E1. 
17 James Ward Lee, ‘Legends In Their Own Time: The Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders,’ in Legendary Ladies of Texas, 
ed. Francis Edwards Abernethy (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994), 198. 
18 Curry, E1. 
19 Linda Williams, Hard Core: Power, Pleasure, and the “Frenzy of the Visible” (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1999), 170. 
20  Gretchen Dykstra, ‘The Times Square Business Improvement District and Its Role in Changing the Face of Times 
Square,’ in Sex, Scams, and Street Life: The Sociology of New York City’s Time Square, ed. Robert P. McNamara 
(Westport: Praeger, 1995), 78. 
21 Peter Bart, Infamous Players: A Tale of Movies, the Mob (and Sex) (New York: Weinstein Books, 2011), 91.  
22 William H. Daly, ‘Law Enforcement in Times Square, 1970s-1990s,’ in Sex, Scams, and Street Life,,98. 
23 Daly, 99. 
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theatres and place Times Square on a more culturally and economically desirable footing.24  
Hence, the Cheerleaders’ lawsuit coincided with a government crackdown on theatres like the 
Pussycat Cinema and films like Debbie Does Dallas, thereby providing a painful one-two punch 
to Times Square’s besieged adult industry. 
It was in this context that a federal court in New York heard the Cheerleaders’ case 
against the Pussycat Cinema.  The court wasted little time in finding that Debbie Does Dallas 
violated the Cheerleaders’ trademark rights. It determined the Cheerleaders’ uniform to be 
protectable trade dress.  It also agreed with the Cheerleaders that viewers of the pornographic 
film would find the similarities between it and the fictional ‘Texas Cowgirls’ uniform worn in 
the film to be ‘confusing.’  As a result, the court held the Pussycat Theater liable for trademark 
infringement. 
Finding themselves legally naked under trademark law, the defendants unsuccessfully 
attempted to shroud their case under the banner of the First Amendment by claiming that they 
were making a commentary on the nature of ‘sexuality in athletics’ in U.S. society.  A successful 
appeal to the First Amendment meant that, even if Debbie Does Dallas did violate the 
Cheerleaders’ trademark rights, the interests of free speech should still allow its screening.   
Applying the alternative avenues test, the court rejected this defence.  Barely able to contain its 
revulsion towards the theatre owner and the film at issue, the court grudgingly acknowledged 
that the film represented ‘speech,’ potentially protected under the First Amendment.  
Nevertheless, it found that an injunction barring the cinema from showing the film posed no First 
Amendment concerns.  Although failing to specify actual alternatives to the white boots, white 
shorts, blue blouse, and white star-studded vest and belt employed by both Debbie and the Dallas 
Cowboys Cheerleaders, the court maintained that the film could convey its message in another 
fashion.  It explained that ‘there are numerous ways in which defendants may comment on 
sexuality in athletics without infringing plaintiff’s trademark.’25   
The court also brushed aside concerns that a judicial bar on the film’s screening 
constituted a forbidden ‘prior restraint’ on speech.  The judicial doctrine of prior restraint, first 
crystallised in the Supreme Court’s 1931 decision in Near v. Minnesota, is a longstanding 
guidepost in First Amendment law that requires courts to strongly disfavour any kind of judicial 
or administrative order that prohibits speech being made in advance of its publication.  Normally, 
the doctrine presumes that any attempt to block use of a communicative forum before actual 
expression has taken place is unconstitutional; instead, to further society’s interest in free 
communication, courts typically allow the expression to occur and leave potential plaintiffs to 
seek relief, through monetary damages, after the fact.26  Yet the court contended that because 
trademark law is ‘content-neutral’ and enforced by private parties, not the government itself, the 
prior restraint doctrine was not at issue.27 
The Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders case illustrates just how narrow free speech protection 
for creative actors accused of trademark infringement was before 1989.28  The court’s 
                                                 
24 Lynne B. Sagalyn, Times Square Roulette: Remaking The City Icon (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 172. 
25 Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 206.  
26 See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 706 (1931) (deeming that prior restraints are presumptively invalid and 
heavily disfavoured under First Amendment analysis). 
27 Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 206. 
28 It is worth noting that 1989 is not a bright-line date.  There were philosophically similar decisions prior to Rogers, 
such as the L.L. Bean case decided two years earlier. In L.L. Bean, the court rejected trademark dilution claims 
brought by the outdoor catalogue giant against an adult magazine for its unauthorised use of the L.L. Bean mark in a 
ribald mock-catalogue.  See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1987) (‘‘It offends 
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willingness to discard typical First Amendment concerns over prior restraints on speech stands in 
marked contrast to other free speech analyses where attempts to pre-emptively enjoin expression 
have been denied even when those expressions have been deemed libellous, obscene, or 
threatening to national security.29  Moreover, under the alternative avenues test, the First 
Amendment only comes into play when the mark at issue is so intimately related to the work’s 
subject matter that the author has no other possible means of explaining what their work is about.   
It is almost always possible to conceptualise the author’s creative interest in some way such that 
other means of expressing that interest are available. In the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders case, 
the court broadly characterised the filmmaker’s expressive point as a commentary on sexuality in 
athletics.  Yet an equally apt characterisation of the filmmaker’s project might have been as a 
commentary on the sexuality of the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders themselves.  Even in 1979, the 
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders were known for being far different from other cheerleading units.   
With their signature low-cut vests and provocative dance routines akin to Las Vegas burlesque, 
they were the first professional squad to make the connection between cheerleading and 
sexuality so explicit.30  Under such a characterisation, the filmmaker might have had little 
alternative to using the Cheerleaders’ protected trade dress and been inoculated from suit under 
the First Amendment.  The court’s decision to describe Debbie Does Dallas in the particular 
manner it chose demonstrates the tremendous potential for judicial censorship under the 
alternative avenues test.  In other cases, courts used the same test to reject the First Amendment 
claims of filmmakers and block their chosen means of expression.  For example, Edgar Rice 
Burroughs filed a trademark infringement suit to stop exhibition of an X-rated film titled Tarz & 
Jane & Boy & Cheeta (1975)31 and American Dairy Queen Corporation used trademark law to 
force a studio to abandon the title ‘Dairy Queens’ for its film about a Minnesota beauty 
pageant.32   
By limiting protectable speech interests to only those situations in which use of the 
trademark is absolutely necessary to the author’s expressive project, the ‘alternative avenues’ test 
stands in marked contrast to other areas of First Amendment law.  In other contexts, American 
law rejects such a cramped view of free speech, preferring not to second-guess a speaker’s 
chosen vernacular and to allow greater breathing space for expressive activities.  For example, in 
Cohen v. California, the Supreme Court recognised that the use of certain words, rather than 
their synonyms, is fundamental to the exercise of First Amendment rights.  The Court overturned 
the conviction of Paul Robert Cohen for disturbing the peace when he walked into a California 
courtroom wearing a jacket emblazoned with the words ‘Fuck the Draft.’33  Responding to the 
government’s argument that Cohen should have expressed his anti-draft sentiments in more 
polite terms, the Court explained: ‘[W]e cannot indulge in the facile assumption that one can 
forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
the Constitution . . . to invoke the [Maine] anti-dilution statute as a basis for enjoining the noncommercial use of a 
trademark by a defendant engaged in a protected form of expression.’’).  That said, no case providing First 
Amendment defences for content creators facing claims of trademark infringement has had the widespread impact of 
Rogers. 
29 Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE 
L.J. 147, 210 (1998). 
30 Pamela J. Bettis & Natalie Guice Adams, ‘Short Skirts and Breast Juts: Cheerleading, Eroticism, and Schools,’ 
Sex Education: Sexuality, Society, and Learning 6 no. 2 (2006): 121, 123. 
31 Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Manns Theatres, 195 U.S.P.Q. 159 (C.D. Cal. 1976). 
32 Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 734 (D. Minn. 1998). 
33 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16-17 (1971). 
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process.’34  Yet, prior to 1989, under the ‘alternative avenues’ test, courts did forbid the use of 
particular words and images by moviemakers and associated entities when those words and 
images symbolised a particular business or product. 
Not every court of the time embraced the ‘alternative avenues’ test.  Some assessed the 
claims of trademark owners against filmmakers under what can best be described as an ad hoc 
balancing approach.  This method involves determining whether consumer confusion is likely—
as noted earlier, the sine qua non for any successful trademark infringement claim—but with a 
simultaneous eye towards the defendant’s interest in free speech.  For example, once a court 
identifies the defendant’s work as a successful parody, an important means of expressing 
criticism and commentary, it may discount evidence traditionally offered to show consumer 
confusion, like the degree of similarity between the plaintiff’s trademark and the mark used by 
the defendant.  The problem with the ad hoc balancing approach is that it offers little predictive 
comfort to content creators accused of infringement.  Just because a court determined that, on 
balance, there is little likelihood of confusion from an expressive work in one case, it is hard to 
know how such a context-specific analysis should translate to the next case.  For example, when 
a lower court determined that consumers were unlikely to confuse Walt Disney Productions’ use 
of the name ‘Tron’ for a 1982 science-fiction film with the electric fuses trademarked under the 
same name, a higher court reversed, contending that the lower court had been overly charitable 
to Disney in how it interpreted the evidence of consumer confusion.35  Whether ad hoc balancing 
or the alternative avenues test was used, Hollywood studios and other content producers faced an 
uncertain and often restrictive legal landscape when it came to using brand names and images in 
their works. 
   
Rogers and the Artistic-Relevance Standard 
 
If filmmakers utilising brand imagery had to tread on hostile and uncertain ground in the 
1970s and 1980s, the legal terrain dramatically shifted in their favour at the decade’s end.  As we 
have seen, up until then, courts charged with balancing the rights of filmmakers with those of 
trademark holders often chose the latter, and jettisoned some time-honored First Amendment 
protections in the process.  This trend began to change, however, in 1989 with the decision in the 
case of Rogers v. Grimaldi.  Even though the Second Circuit for the United States Court of 
Appeals—the same court that decided the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders case—issued the ruling, 
the results were diametrically different.  In fact, the Rogers decision expressly repudiated the 
alternative avenues test and ushered in a new, more filmmaker-friendly approach towards the 
balancing of free speech and trademark rights.   
The case started when famed Italian director Federico Fellini made a movie about two 
fictional Italian cabaret performers who imitated Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire.  Fellini titled 
his movie, his third to last film, Ginger and Fred.  Reviewers praised Fellini’s work, which 
premiered in Rome in 1986.36  Ginger and Fred has been described as a ‘hyperfilm,’ as the film 
serves as both a fictional narrative and an autobiographical exploration of the great director and 
his filmography.  Frequent Fellini collaborator Marcello Mastroianni played the role of ‘Fred,’ 
who serves as Fellini’s surrogate in the film.  Meanwhile, Giulietta Masina, Fellini’s real life 
                                                 
34 Id. at 26. 
35 McGraw-Edison Co. v. Walter Disney Prods., 787 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1986). 
36 Hollis Alpert, Fellini: A Life (New York: Atheneum, 1986), 298. 
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wife, played the role of ‘Ginger.’37  Although not all critics were so kind, Vincent Canby of The 
New York Times placed the film favourably within the Fellini canon, remarking that the film 
looked and sounded ‘like the work of no other director.’38 
Actress and dancer Rogers did not view Ginger and Fred so favourably, however.  Her 
longtime co-star Astaire had died in the beginning of 1986.  After months of silence, Rogers 
issued a statement after the release of Fellini’s film.  She proclaimed the film ‘offensive to her 
reputation and personality,’ and presumably to her former co-star’s as well.39  She also initiated 
an $8 million lawsuit against Alberto Grimaldi and MGM, the motion picture’s producer and 
distributor, for false endorsement under trademark law.  Shortly thereafter, when asked by the 
press about Rogers’ lawsuit on NBC’s Today Show (1952- ), Fellini wryly commented ‘perhaps 
she has not seen the film . . . or has been misinformed.’40  But the lawsuit was more than a minor 
irritant for the director.  Originally scheduled to present the Oscar for Best Picture, alongside 
famed directors Akira Kurosawa and Billy Wilder, at the 1986 Academy Awards, Fellini 
declined to travel to Hollywood after the lawsuit was filed, instead allowing John Huston to take 
his place.41 
In her lawsuit, Rogers contended that Fellini had improperly used her name without 
permission, thereby creating consumer confusion over her endorsement of the work.  Rogers’ 
permission would definitely have added symbolic and economic capital to the film.  Rogers is 
listed at #14 on the American Film Institute’s list of the greatest female screen legends in film 
history and previously lent her name to a line of lingerie sold by J.C. Penney.  The court 
remarked that she is ‘among that small elite of the entertainment world whose identities are 
readily called to mind by just their first names.’  Nevertheless, Grimaldi and MGM countered 
that enforcement of Rogers’ alleged trademark interest in her name would trample their First 
Amendment rights by restricting freedom of expression in the production of a creative work. 
In the end, Grimaldi and MGM won a seminal victory, reducing the scope of trademark 
law and strengthening First Amendment protections for artists.  The court announced that it was 
discarding the alternative avenues test—a test that the Fellini film would have clearly failed.42  It 
explained that, while the test might have been appropriate in its original application involving 
claims against landowners, it was not a good match for trademark law.  Unlike a landowner’s 
decision to prevent certain speech in a physical location, a trademark owner’s infringement suit 
not only the influences the speech’s location but also its actual content.43  The typical result in a 
trademark case is an injunction completely stopping the defendant from using the mark at issue.   
Given the ability of a successful trademark infringement lawsuit to remove particular speech 
from the marketplace of ideas entirely, the court concluded that the alternative avenues test was 
too restrictive and had to be replaced with another mechanism better suited to balancing free 
expression with trademark rights.44 
                                                 
37 Millicent Marcus, After Fellini: National Cinema in the Postmodern Age (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2002), 184. 
38 Vincent Canby, ‘Fellini’s “Ginger and Fred”’, The New York Times, 28 March 1986, C8. 
39 John Baxter, Fellini (London: Fourth Estate, 1993), 346; Ginger Rogers, Ginger: My Story (New York: Harper 
Collins, 1991), 414. 
40 Alpert, 300. 
41 Baxter, 346. 
42 Rogers, 875 F.3d at 999. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 997-1001. 
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The court’s solution was a new test—one that was more solicitous of artistic choice and, 
hence, more friendly to Hollywood filmmakers. Instead of simply asking whether the filmmaker 
could have made her point in an alternative fashion, the court announced a new sort of enquiry: 
whether ‘the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some 
artistic relevance, [whether] the title explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the 
work.’45  A title satisfying both the ‘some artistic relevance’ and not explicitly misleading 
criteria receives First Amendment immunity from a trademark infringement action. 
The court easily concluded that Fellini’s film met both of the newly announced criteria.   
First, the title was artistically relevant to the underlying film.  The court described this 
requirement as merely requiring a ‘minimum threshold of artistic relevance to the film’s 
content.’46  The film’s main characters were named ‘Ginger’ and ‘Fred.’  Moreover, these names 
were not arbitrarily chosen to capitalise on the fame of Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire.  Rather, 
they were selected because the two main characters made their living imitating the famous 
Rogers and Astaire duo.  As a result, the names had the requisite amount of artistic relevance. 
The court spent more time on the second criterion.  Rogers maintained that the film’s title 
was explicitly misleading.  She offered a survey of likely moviegoers, fourteen per cent of 
which, when presented with an advertisement featuring the film’s title, seemed to believe that 
Rogers was involved with the making of the Ginger and Fred film.47  She also made the 
argument that the film’s title misled consumers not just as to her involvement, but also as to its 
subject, by causing them to believe that the film was about her and Fred Astaire in a direct, 
biographical sense.48   
The court, however, concluded that the risk of some consumer confusion was tolerable in 
order to protect interests in artistic expression.49  As a result, it was willing to ignore the survey 
data showing that fourteen per cent of the consuming public would be confused as to Rogers’ 
involvement with Fellini’s project.50  In addition, the court emphasised that the ‘Ginger and 
Fred’ title was susceptible to multiple interpretations and, as a result, it could not be described as 
explicitly misleading.51  It was true, the court admitted, that those who thought the title referred 
to a true biography of the real-life singing duo were being fooled.  But the court also noted that 
the title has ‘an ironic meaning’ that was equally valid.52  It credited an affidavit from Fellini 
himself, which explained that he selected Rogers and Astaire as ‘a glamorous and care-free 
symbol of what American cinema represented during the harsh times which Italy experienced in 
the 1930s and 1940s.’53  Rather than being misleading, the title, argued the court, ‘is an integral 
element of the film and the filmmaker’s artistic expressions.’54  Because the title was artistically 
relevant to the film and not explicitly misleading, Grimaldi and MGM’s First Amendment 
defence succeeded and Rogers’ complaint was dismissed. 
The Rogers decision has proved influential and expansive.  Over the past two decades, 
several other federal courts have adopted the Rogers test.  The test soon grew to encompass not 
                                                 
45 Id. at 999. 
46 Id. at 1001. 
47 Id.. at 1001, n. 8. 








just movie titles, but trademark claims against works of artistic expression, including claims 
where the challenged trademark use occurs in the body of the work.  For example, when the 
video game Grand Theft Auto borrowed from the trademark and trade dress of a Los Angeles 
strip club to depict a Los Angeles-like city, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that 
the uses were immunised under the Rogers test.55 
Courts have also construed Rogers’ two prongs broadly.  One might worry that an open-
ended judicial enquiry into ‘artistic relevance’ could shortchange the expressive interests of 
content creators.  It would seem that the judges deciding the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders case 
would be loathe to credit any artistic design to the creators of Debbie Does Dallas.  A similar 
response might result when asked to apply Rogers to other seemingly unsavoury or transgressive 
works.  Giving the benefit of the doubt to Fellini’s artistic vision is one thing; giving this benefit 
to filmmakers not legitimated by the cultural elite is another. 
Yet in deciphering artistic relevance, courts have generally given great deference to the 
vision of defendants.  As the court in the Grand Theft Auto case characterised it, ‘the level of 
relevance merely must be above zero.’56  Even if the connection between the trademark use and 
underlying work’s communicative goal is ‘tenuous,’ the artistic relevance standard is still 
satisfied.57  Hence, it is extremely rare for this criterion not to be satisfied.  In fact, after Rogers, 
courts have recognised the First Amendment interests of pornographic filmmakers as well as the 
makers of notoriously violent video games and dismissed the trademark lawsuits against them—
a far cry from the approach of the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders court, which appeared to factor 
the supposedly ‘gross and revolting’ nature of the allegedly infringing work against the 
defendants when weighing the merits of the plaintiff’s claims.58  It may have taken the artistic 
patina of someone like Fellini to dislodge the ‘alternative avenues’ test, but once dislodged, 
courts have looked favourably upon the expressive rights of a host of creative entities, not just 
those of highbrow directors. 
Under Rogers, once it has ascertained the mark’s artistic relevance, a court proceeds to 
consideration of whether the defendant’s use was explicitly misleading.  Again, the courts have 
construed this criterion in a speech-friendly fashion.  In any trademark infringement lawsuit, the 
trademark holder bears the burden of demonstrating a likelihood of consumer confusion from the 
defendant’s use.  Courts have been careful to require something over and above this proof of 
likely consumer confusion when the Rogers test is called into play.  The Second Circuit and 
other courts mandate the evidence of confusion be ‘particularly compelling’ to invalidate a 
Rogers defence.59  Other courts replace the likelihood of confusion analysis entirely, trading it 
for one more tilted in the defendant’s favour.  In fact, it seems that once courts determine that the 
trademark is being used in an artistic manner, they are more than willing to jettison the 
                                                 
55 E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2008). 
56 Id. at 1099. 
57 Roxbury Entm’t v. Penthous Media Grp., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2009).  But see Parks v. 
LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 454 (6th Cir. 2003) (adopting the Rogers defence but reversing and remanding to the 
district court on the question of whether the use of Rosa Parks’s name had any artistic relevance to the OutKast song 
at issue in the suit). 
58 See, e.g., E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008); Roxbury 
Entm’t v. Penthouse Media Grp., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1175-76 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media 
Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 900-01 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
59 E.g., Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 664-65 (5th Cir. 2011); Twin Peaks Prods., 
Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 11 
notoriously unpredictable likelihood of confusion analysis for their own ‘common sense’ 
analysis, which is geared towards allowing the challenged uses.60 
Of course, the broad protections granted by Rogers raise the question as to why, when it 
comes to unauthorised use of trademarks, courts have moved in the direction of greater artistic 
latitude for filmmakers and other content creators over the past two decades.  Part of the reason 
might have to do with simply getting used to the notion of movies as speech.  Works of 
entertainment did not qualify as speech under the First Amendment until 1952.  Not unrelatedly, 
until recently, defendants in trademark disputes rarely asserted a First Amendment defence.61  It 
has taken some time for courts and litigants to explicitly wrestle with the balancing of expressive 
interests in film with the perhaps more established rights of trademark holders. 
Notably, during the same period, not every legal regime has moved in the direction of 
greater creative authority for content creators.  Copyright law can often be invoked to restrict the 
activities of filmmakers, even when the filmmaker’s activities touch on expression most would 
deem at the core of the First Amendment.  For example, when conservative politician Charles 
‘Chuck’ Devore produced two music videos, ‘The Hope of November’ and ‘All She Wants to Do 
is Tax,’ for campaign advertisements that meant to skewer Barbara Boxer—his liberal opponent 
for California’s seat in the United States Senate—and to riff on musician Don Henley’s 1980s 
megahits ‘The Boys of Summer’ and ‘All She Wants to Do is Dance,’ Henley invoked copyright 
law to force the videos’ removal from YouTube.  Notably, the court held in DeVore’s favour on 
a related trademark infringement claim, but granted judgment for Henley on the copyright 
claims.  DeVore attempted to make a First Amendment argument to justify his unauthorised use 
of Henley’s songs under copyright’s ‘fair use’ defence, but to no avail, even though his allegedly 
infringing songs constituted core political speech made during the heat of an electoral 
campaign.62 
This points to another possible reason for the courts’ increasing reluctance to stifle 
filmmakers’ use of trademarked materials.  Unlike copyright law, which is principally guided by 
the language of a comprehensive federal statutory regime, trademark law relies heavily on judge-
made tests and standards.  Although a federal statute does provide some grounding for trademark 
law, legislatures have encouraged courts to develop the ‘common law’ of trademarks on their 
own initiative.  This gives judges deciding trademark cases more freedom to manoeuvre than if 
they were simply applying statutory language.  With courts operating under the assumption that 
copyright’s statutory provisions effectively address free speech concerns and foreclose additional 
judicial innovations in this area, copyright cases rarely invoke the First Amendment; by contrast, 
trademark cases do at times expressly weigh free speech interests.  Trademark law’s common 
law tradition permits judges to conceptualise the law at a high level of abstraction, allowing for 
more judicial discretion when it comes to balancing trademark holder property rights with the 
free speech interests of those accused of infringement.  The Rogers test elucidates this common 
law innovation, as it was a test that not only rejected a prior test deemed insufficiently solicitous 
of speech interests, but it also was created by a group of judges completely on their own 
initiative with no applicable statutory language to restrict their innovation. 
                                                 
60 See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Recods, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 899-902 (9th Cir. 2002); Club Mediterranee, S.A. v. 
Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., No. 04-20273-CIV-MARTINEZ, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3543, at 9-11; Volkswagen 
AG v. Dorling Kindersley Publ’g, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 793, 801-02, 810 (E.D. Mich. 2009). 
61 Lisa P. Ramsey, ‘Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law,’ Southern Methodist University Law 
Review 61 (2008): 381, 385. 
62 Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
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Balancing Trademark Protection and First Amendment Rights in the Post-Rogers World 
 
Over time, the Rogers test has expanded to provide potential cover for all uses of 
trademarks in artistic works, not just uses in titles.  In addition, courts have generally interpreted 
its two prongs in an increasingly speech-protective fashion.  As a result, the legal system has 
given filmmakers greater expressive latitude in their unauthorised use of household brands.  But 
this discretion is not without bounds.  Trademark holders are still, at times, able to flex their legal 
muscles in a way that has consequences for Hollywood content.  Judicial interpretation of the 
Rogers test continues to evolve, leading to exploitable legal grey areas for owners of famous 
brand names.  
 
Case Study: Louis Vuitton v. Warner Bros. 
 
The results of the recent Louis Vuitton suit against the makers of The Hangover II 
illustrate the strong protection that filmmakers have typically enjoyed under the Rogers test.  As 
one of Hollywood’s most successful comedy franchises, The Hangover trilogy grossed more 
than a billion dollars for Warner Bros. and its partners.  But the wild profit party thrown by the 
movie franchise was not without its own litigation hangover, as the trilogy spawned its own 
cottage industry of intellectual property suits.  Perhaps most famously, the artist who created 
Mike Tyson’s Maori-inspired facial tattoo took Warner Bros. to court for its failure to license 
rights to the marking when one of the characters in the movie ended up, after a night of 
debauchery, with a look-alike rendition emblazoned on his visage.63  The case settled shortly 
thereafter on confidential terms.64  By contrast, the other intellectual property dispute related to 
the movie touched directly on claims of trademark infringement and unfair competition for the 
unauthorised use of a famous mark in the course of the movie. 
In the suit,65 luxury handbag manufacturer Louis Vuitton sued Warner Bros. for 
misidentifying a knock-off item featuring their most celebrated and iconic design, the so-called 
Toile Monogram, in the movie.  In an early scene, The Hangover’s fearless protagonists make 
their way through Los Angeles International Airport en route to Thailand, where, of course, 
hilarity and hijinks ensue.  Alan, played by Zach Galifianakis, carries what appears to be an 
over-the-shoulder Louis Vuitton ‘Keepall.’  When the group arrives at the gate, Alan sets the bag 
on a chair.  As Stu, played by Ed Helms, moves the bag to make room for one of their pals to sit, 
Alan vociferously objects: ‘Careful that is . . . that is a Lewis Vuitton,’ he exhorts.  In fact, the 
bag in question was neither a Louis Vuitton nor a ‘Lewis Vuitton,’ but, rather, a notorious Louis 
Vuitton knock-off made by copycat manufacturer Diophy, a company that had sold its less 
expensive versions of faux Louis Vuitton merchandise throughout the United States.  
Consequently, the real Louis Vuitton was thoroughly unamused and a civil action resulted. 
Interestingly, in the course of litigation, Louis Vuitton strategically limited its claims.  It 
did not assert that Warner Bros.’ use deceived the public into thinking that Louis Vuitton 
sponsored or was affiliated with the movie.  Rather, Louis Vuitton believed that the scene in 
                                                 
63 See Writmill v. Warner Bros. Ent. Inc. 4:11-cv-00752 (E.D. Mo. 2001). 
64 Matthew Belloni, ‘Warner Bros. Settles “Hangover II” Tattoo Lawsuit (Exclusive),’ The Hollywood Reporter, 20 
June 2011, http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/warner-bros-settles-hangover-ii-203377 [THIS CITATION 
NEEDS AN ACCESSED DATE IF AVAILABLE]. 
65 Louis Vuitton Mallatier S.A. v. Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 172 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  
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question infringed its marks by mischaracterising the Diophy bag as an authentic Louis Vuitton 
bag.  According to Louis Vuitton, Warner Bros.’ misrepresentation created a likelihood of 
confusion in the minds of the consuming public and thereby injured the Louis Vuitton brand by 
conflating it with an inferior product.  In response to the allegations, Warner Bros. moved to 
dismiss the suit on the basis of the Rogers defence. 
The court hearing the case took a broad and favourable view of the defence.  On the first 
element of the Rogers test, the decision provided a generous reading of artistic relevance, noting 
that the standard is ‘purposely low’ and satisfied unless the use has no artistic relevance 
‘whatsoever.’66  This threshold was clearly met with Alan’s ironic use of the Diophy bag and 
mispronunciation of ‘Louis’ while grousing at the mistreatment of his purported luxury good.  
On the second element of the Rogers test, the court found that the use did not ‘explicitly 
mislead[] as to the source or the content of the work.’  As such, the Rogers defence immunised 
the filmmakers from liability.  Importantly, the court rejected Louis Vuitton’s argument that the 
‘explicitly misleading’ test should include consumer confusion about the source or content of a 
third party’s goods (here, the Diophy bag).  Prior cases limited the ‘explicitly misleading’ test to 
confusion as to whether the defendant’s work was sponsored by the plaintiff-rightsholder.  To 
support its argument for a more expansive view of ‘explicitly misleading,’ Louis Vuitton drew 
on the object of this essay’s first case study—the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders case.67   
Significantly, the court expressly contrasted Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders to Rogers and 
rejected the viability of the former in favour of the latter.  First, the court noted that the former 
case’s approach to First Amendment defences to trademark claims had been properly criticised 
by a number of courts and observers and had been effectively replaced with the latter case’s 
approach in matters involving artistic works.68  Second, the court noted that even the Dallas 
Cowboys Cheerleaders case did not allow the type of broad application of the Lanham Act being 
advocated by Louis Vuitton in its suit against Warner Bros.  Specifically, Louis Vuitton claimed 
liability based on consumer confusion that ‘the Diophy bag is really a genuine Louis Vuitton 
bag; and . . . that Louis Vuitton approved the use of the Diophy bag in the [f]ilm.’69  However, 
neither type of confusion described by Louis Vuitton spoke to the actionable theory approved by 
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders—that the film itself (rather than a product within it) was 
sponsored or approved by the trademark holder.  In so doing, the court furthered the emerging, 
Rogers-inspired view disfavouring Lanham Act claims that attack content within artistic works.   
As the court held, any such claims must be read narrowly and must demonstrate forms of 
consumer confusion that are 'particularly compelling.’70 
It is also worth noting that the Louis Vuitton court even decided the issue on a motion to 
dismiss, prior to the initiation of discovery and despite Vuitton’s insistence that it should have 
the right to determine, among other things, whether Warner Bros. meant to use a Diophy bag or 
not.  The early adjudication of trademark claims involving artistic works bodes well for the 
                                                 
66 Id. at 178 (citing Rogers, 875 F. 2d at 999) (emphasis included). 
67 In Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, the Second Circuit recognised that the plaintiff’s claim did not necessarily 
require a finding of consumer confusion as to the origin of the film; confusion as to the plaintiff’s sponsorship or 
approval of the trademark use alone sufficed for a cognizable Lanham Act violation. 
68 Louis Vuitton Mallatier S.A. v. Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 172, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(describing Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders as ‘a decision whose First Amendment approach Rogers expressly 
declined to follow and which has been criticised by other courts’).   
69 Id. at 181. 
70 Id. at 182 (citing Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d Cir. 1993) (emphasis 
added by court). 
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expressive rights of filmmakers, especially those who may not be well-financed or supported by 
the major studios.  The threat of litigation can have a chilling effect on expressive uses of 
trademarks, even when the claims advanced by a rightsholder have little or no merit.  Given the 
high costs of litigation, especially for infringement suits in federal court, many creators have 
eschewed uses of anyone else’s intellectual property for fear of the hassle and expense of 
defence.  Furthermore, claims of infringement can attach liability to downstream distributors and 
exhibitors, thereby creating a cloud on title and making release of a film difficult.  The Louis 
Vuitton case adds to an emerging body of case law that expressly affirms courts’ option to 
quickly dispense with claims stemming from the unauthorised use of trademarks in artistic 
works.   
Finally, the Louis Vuitton court immunised the defendants from additional unfair 
competition and New York state law dilution claims.  It reasoned that the same First Amendment 
considerations (i.e., those embodied in the Rogers test) that immunised Warner Bros. from 
liability under the Lanham Act provided a safe harbour for Warner Bros. from these common 
law and state law claims as well.71  Thus, the Rogers test’s First Amendment moorings allow it 
to grant broad protection for liability flowing from unauthorised trademark uses in artistic 
content. 
 
The Limits of Rogers 
 
Despite the Louis Vuitton case and other recent successes for content creators warding off 
legal claims pertaining to unauthorised use of trademarks in artistic works, Rogers’ influence 
should not be overstated.  Although implemented by most courts that have considered it, at least 
one federal circuit court (the Third Circuit) has repeatedly expressed scepticism, contending that 
Rogers immunises too many unauthorised trademark uses.72  Moreover, even in jurisdictions that 
have adopted the Rogers test, there continue to be restrictions on filmmakers’ activities.  The 
Ninth Circuit has expressly adopted Rogers, for example,73 yet that fact did not stop a court in 
the Central District of California from issuing an injunction in 2012 against the release of the 
aforementioned ‘mockbuster’ Clash of the Empires in advance of the summer release of the New 
Line Cinema blockbuster The Hobbit: An Unexpected Journey.74  
In the case, Warner Bros. Entertainment v. The Global Asylum, Inc.,75 the court found 
that the defendants ran badly afoul of the Rogers safe harbour due to several factors.  
Specifically, based on its reading of the language of relevant Ninth Circuit precedent, the Global 
Asylum court divined and identified two implicit limitations on the Rogers defence that applied 
in the case.76  First, the court supplanted the previously lax standard for meeting artistic 
                                                 
71 Id. at 184. 
72 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 3-09-cv-05990, at 22-23 (3d Cir., May 21, 2013).  See also Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, 
Inc. 542 F.3d 1007, 1018 (3d Cir. 2008). 
73 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). 
74 Eriq Gardner, ‘Judge Blocks Release of ‘Age of the Hobbits’ Movie,’ The Hollywood Reporter, 10 December 
2012, http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/judge-blocks-release-age-hobbits-400062 [THIS CITATION 
NEEDS AN ACCESSED DATE IF AVAILABLE]. 
75 Warner Bros. Ent. v. The Global Asylum, Inc., No. CV 12-9574 PSG (CWx), 2012 WL 6951315 (C. D. Cal., Dec. 
10, 2012). 
76 The court also stated that, besides showing that the allegedly infringing use had artistic relevance and was 
explicitly misleading, a defendant also needed to demonstrate that the mark in question had obtained a widespread 
meaning beyond its source-identifying function.  Id. at *17.  Otherwise, reasoned the court, access to the verbiage 
making up the mark did not impact a legitimate First Amendment right.  Id.  Here, the court found that the 
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relevance by holding that a usage is, per se, not artistically relevant if the defendant ‘merely 
borrow[s] another’s property to get attention.’77  The imposition of this additional requirement 
fundamentally narrows the defence and moves it far from the deferential version applied by the 
actual Rogers court and such decisions as Louis Vuitton—cases where courts held that the 
threshold for artistic relevance was ‘purposefully low’ and was met unless a use of a mark had 
no artistic relevance ‘whatsoever.’78  
Second, the Global Asylum court held that any excusable artistic use must be related to 
the original mark itself.79  As the court reasoned, every case in the Rogers universe to date had 
involved use of a mark that was related to the original mark itself, whether it was Fellini 
referring to Ginger to evoke the spirit of Ginger Rogers or Rockstar Games drawing on the name 
of a real Los Angeles strip club in order to heighten the realism of their Grand Theft Auto game 
which is set in the fictional, but L.A.-influenced, city of San Andreas.80  Since the defendants in 
Global Asylum had expressly disclaimed any link between their use of the term ‘Hobbit’ and 
Tolkien’s Hobbits, the court held that the defendants had effectively waived their claim of 
artistic relevance.81   
Of course, with such an analysis, the Global Asylum court threatens to put defendants in a 
troubling Catch-22.  After all, a defendant will frequently claim that their use of an allegedly 
infringing term had an unrelated genesis and was not drawn from the allegedly infringed term.    
Such a tactic is used to avoid a finding of bad faith in the likelihood-of-confusion analysis that 
courts must conduct when determining if the plaintiff has made a prima facie case under the 
Lanham Act and if the use is explicitly misleading and therefore ineligible for the Rogers safe 
harbour.  Moreover, contrary to its holding on the artistic relevance issue, the court actually 
found that the defendants were trying to refer to Tolkein’s Hobbits in several other parts of the 
decision in areas where such an attempt would factor against the defendants, rather than for 
them.  Indeed, the court made much ado about the fact that, rather than just using the word 
‘Hobbit’ in their title, the defendants also mimicked the distinctive gold, stylised and capitalised 
font of the plaintiff when they made use of the term ‘Hobbit,’ thereby making the association 
with the Plaintiff even more explicit.  The court also noted that media coverage of The Age of 
Hobbits described the work as a ‘reimagined version of J.R.R. Tolkien's mythical universe’ and 
‘a fantasy tale inspired by J.R.R. Tolkien's The Lord of the Rings.’82  With these facts in mind, 
the court held that the defendants’ use was explicitly misleading and therefore not subject to the 
Rogers defence, even if it had been artistically relevant in the first place.  All told, the Global 
Asylum decision exemplifies the types of restrictions that courts may place on the Rogers 
defence—limitations that can effectively neutralise the defence despite its de jure availability. 
                                                                                                                                                             
defendants had barely demonstrated that the word ‘Hobbit’ had a non-source-identifying function among some 
consumers.  Id.  Although the use of this factor as part of the Rogers test did not hurt the defendants in this particular 
case, Id., it established another hurdle for reliance on the defence going forward—at least in the Ninth Circuit. Id. 
77 Id. at *16. 
78 Id. at *15. 
79 Id. at *16. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at *17. 
82 Id. at *13.  Though the court admits that ‘there is no evidence on the record that Asylum itself was responsible for 
disseminating these statements, Asylum has also presented no evidence that it made any effort to correct the 
misrepresentations about the film or disassociate itself from Plaintiffs' works—at least not until Plaintiffs threatened 
legal action against it if it failed to take such steps.’  Id. 
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At the same time, the Rogers test continues to evolve and, over time, could change in a 
manner that is not as protective of artistic expression.  One court tried to limit Rogers’ 
application by requiring a defendant asserting the defence to prove that the mark at issue is ‘of 
such cultural significance that it has become an integral part of the public’s vocabulary.’83  
Although other courts have declined this invitation to effectively limit the protections of Rogers 
to only uses of truly iconic brand names,84 this example reveals the flexible nature of common 
law decision-making in this area and raises the concern that the free speech protections now 
available to filmmakers may disappear in the future.  
A more significant limitation on Rogers is that it only applies to non-commercial speech.  
According to some courts, once a work is deemed ‘commercial,’ a court is no longer obligated to 
address a Rogers defence or any other First Amendment appeal.85  Such a rule has profound 
consequences on the availability of the Rogers defence.  Determining where the boundary 
between commercial and non-commercial speech falls is a task riddled with uncertainty.  Those 
making movies can take comfort in various decisions holding that films, music videos, video 
games, and books all constitute forms of non-commercial speech, even when they are obviously 
produced and sold to realise a profit.  That said, this position is not black letter law—at least not 
yet.  Several cases have contributed to the uncertain legal landscape by labelling the 
entertainment industry’s unauthorized use of third-party intellectual property in titles or content 
as ‘commercial’ in certain contexts from which it is difficult to divine a coherent rule.86  For 
example, use of the ‘Dairy Queen’ trademark in the title of the film Dairy Queens about fictional 
beauty pageants in the Midwest was deemed ‘commercial’ by the court review and, therefore, 
ineligible for any First Amendment solicitude.  As a result, New Line Cinema was forced to 
change the film’s title to Drop Dead Gorgeous prior to its release in 1999.  Similarly, the use of 
Dr. Seuss’ trademarks and copyrights in a book about the O.J. Simpson trial written in the style 
of ‘The Cat in the Hat’ was deemed ‘commercial,’ thereby strengthening infringement claims 
that resulted in the issuance of an injunction against the book’s publication and distribution.87 
Furthermore, the distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech as applied 
to film may become more difficult to make as studios increasingly turn to product placement and 
merchandising tie-ins to maximise revenue.  At some point, a motion picture crosses the line 
from ‘film’ to ‘advertisement.’  At that point, courts appear willing to let First Amendment 
interests recede.  On this front, the decision Facenda v. N.F.L. Films88 is instructive in that it 
expressly denied a Rogers defence for the National Football League when it used, without 
authorization, the voice of legendary sports announcer John Facenda in its twenty-two minute 
film The Making of Madden NFL 06.89  Facenda is, of course, the legendary ‘Voice of God’ from 
NFL Films fame.  Shortly before his death, Facenda had provided the NFL with a broad release 
allowing them to exploit his audio recordings in any way, so long as the use not ‘constitute an 
endorsement or sponsorship of any product or service.’90  Facenda’s estate raised a trademark 
claim for false endorsement, contending that fans hearing his voice on the film would assume 
                                                 
83 Rebelution, LLC v. Perez, 732 F. Supp. 2d 883, 887-88 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
84 Winchester Mystery House, LLC v. Global Asylum, Inc., 210 Cal. App. 4th 579 (2012). 
85 Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc. 542 F.3d 1007, 1016-18 (3d Cir. 2008). 
86 Ramsey, 397-98. 
87 Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1402-06 (9th Cir. 1997); Am. Dairy Queen 
Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 735 (D. Minn. 1998). 
88 542 F.3d 1007 (3d Cir. 2008). 
89 Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1018 (3d Cir. 2008). 
90 Id. at 1019 (quoting release language). 
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that he had lent his approval to the film and the video game it was describing, Madden NFL 
(1988- ).  The NFL maintained that its periodic use of Facenda’s voice represented an artistic 
choice for a documentary film, not an effort to confuse consumers as to endorsement or 
sponsorship.91  The court rejected this argument, explaining that the NFL’s ‘economic 
motivation’ rendered the film commercial speech.92  Because no one in the film had anything 
negative to say about the video game (i.e., in the style of a hagiography, it served as an 
unabashed celebration of the work and its making), the court did not believe the film had a 
‘documentary purpose,’93 and, in the end, concluded it was only meant to serve as an 
advertisement for the Madden video game.94  As a result, the promotional use was commercial 
and the NFL could not take advantage of the Rogers defence.95   
The Facenda case also flags two other potentially noteworthy limitations to the Rogers 
defence.  First, Facenda casts some doubt about the extension of Rogers to protect trademark 
uses in artistic content, rather than just artistic titling.  Although the Facenda court admitted that 
the Rogers test had been expressly adopted by four circuits,96 it took pains to point out that only 
two circuit court decisions had actually applied the test to immunise anything more than the title 
of an artistic work.97  And, in one of those decisions, a dissenting opinion refused to apply 
Rogers precisely because it was being extended from its original scope (titles) to a broader 
application (content).98  Admittedly, since Facenda, that number has increased.99  Yet Facenda 
is correct that the vast majority of Rogers-related cases—like the Rogers case itself—have 
involved the use of trademarks in titles rather than in the underlying content itself.100  The 
continued expansion of Rogers to cover underlying content therefore remains probable but 
nevertheless uncertain. 
Second, and more broadly, Facenda demonstrates that the Rogers test itself has not (yet?) 
earned acceptance across all U.S. courts.  The Facenda decision acknowledged that the defence 
had been adopted, at the time, by four federal circuit courts (including the influential Second and 
Ninth Circuits).101  Yet that fact did not prevent the Third Circuit from expressing scepticism 
                                                 
91 Id. at 1016. 
92 Id. at 1017. 
93 Id. at 1018. 
94 Id. at 1017. 
95 Id. at 1016, 1018.  See also Dillinger, LLC v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 2011 WL 2457678, *4 n.1 (S.D. Ind. 16 June 2011) 
(describing Rogers test as interrogating ‘intentional use of another’s intellectual property for commercial profit’); 
Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor America, 2012 WL 1022247 (S.D.N.Y. 22 March 2012) (failing to 
even consider a Rogers defence in granting summary judgment to Louis Vuitton on claims of trademark dilution for 
car manufacturer Hyundai’s one-second shot of a basketball with a pattern suggestive of Louis Vuitton’s monogram 
in a Super Bowl advertisement). 
96 Id. at 1015.  This number has increased since the ruling.  See, e.g., Univ. of Alabama Bd. of Trustees v. New Life 
Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1276–77 (11th Cir. 2012) (adopting the Rogers defence in the Eleventh Circuit). 
97 Id. at 1016 (citing Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989); 
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 936-37 (6th Cir. 2003)).  As the Cliffs Notes court held, ‘[T]he 
Rogers balancing approach is generally applicable to Lanham claims against works of artistic expres-sion.’ 
98 ETW, 332 F.3d at 943-49 (Clay, J., dissenting). 
99 See, e.g., E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F. 3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008).   
100 See, e.g., Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989) (movie title); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 
353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003) (photograph name and the body of the work), Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 
453 (6th Cir. 2003) (song title); Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 668 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(magazine name).   
101 Id. at 1015. See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 451–52 (6th Cir. 2003); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 
Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002); Sugar Busters LLC v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 269 & n. 7 (5th Cir. 1999);  
 18 
about the defence and declining to adopt it in the case presented.102  Given the reality of national 
(if not international) distribution of entertainment content and the risks of favourable forum 
shopping by trademark-holding plaintiffs, the absence of universal adoption of the Rogers 
defence can create the spectre of liability in less protective jurisdictions and can implicate 




 Over the past quarter century, the legal approach to balancing trademark rights with 
freedom of artistic expression has undergone a seismic shift.  Films are now considered forms of 
art fully within the scope of First Amendment protection and courts have adopted a mechanism 
for reconciling the property interests of trademark holders with the expressive interests of 
filmmakers (and other creative actors) in a way that often tilts in the latter’s favour.  Fellini’s 
film enjoyed only a middling critical reception, but it ushered in a new legal paradigm for those 
who use trademarks to create new expression.  It is important to recognise, however, that not 
everyone whom this filmmaker-friendly trend in the law is meant to protect can effectively 
harness it.  Major studios with significant resources can take advantage of the Rogers test and 
subsequent generous judicial glosses on its ‘artistically relevant’ and ‘explicitly misleading’ 
terms.  But smaller filmmakers may feel the need to capitulate to the claims of trademark holders 
rather than investing in expensive and uncertain legal proceedings.  In addition, changes to the 
film industry, including greater product placement and an increased focus on building and 
monetising ‘brands’ spawned by successful movie franchises, threaten the vitality of the current 
balance between filmmaking and trademark law.  As the line between cinematic artistry and 
advertising continues to dissolve and business models and incentives continue to change, the law 
in this area will not stand still.  Just like future filmmakers, future courts will need to innovate.   
 
                                                 
102 Id. at 1018 (‘Because we hold that “The Making of Madden NFL 06” is commercial speech rather than artistic 
expression, we need not reach the issue whether our Court will adopt the Rogers test. We acknowledge that 
commercial speech does receive some First Amendment protection. . . . Yet the Lanham Act customarily avoids 
violating the First Amendment, in part by enforcing a trademark only when consumers are likely to be misled or 
confused by the alleged infringer’s use.’) (internal citations omitted). 
